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RECONCILING THE EVENT CALCULUS 
WITH THE SITUATION CALCULUS 
ROBERT KOWALSKI AND FARIBA SADRI 
I> In this paper, to compare the situation calculus and event calculus we 
formulate both as logic programs and prove properties of these by reason- 
ing with their completions augmented with induction. We thus show that 
the situation calculus and event calculus imply one another. Whereas our 
derivation of the event calculus from the situation calculus requires the 
use of induction, our derivation of the situation calculus from the event 
calculus does not. We also show that in certain concrete applications, uch 
as the missing car example, conclusions that seem to require the use of 
induction in the situation calculus can be derived without induction in the 
event calculus. To compare the two calculi, we need to make a number of 
small modifications to both. As a by-product of these modifications, the 
resulting calculi can be used to reason about both actual and hypothetical 
states of affairs, including counterfactual ones. We further show how the 
core axioms of both calculi can be extended to deal with domain or state 
constraints and certain types of ramifications. We illustrate this by exam- 
ples from legislation and the blocks world. © Elsevier Science Inc., 1997 <1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we revisit our earlier comparison of the situation calculus and event 
calculus [11] using a more general approach to the representations of situations, in 
the spirit of Van Belleghem, Denecker, and De Schreye [20, 21]. The resulting 
more general formalizations of both calculi combine the situation calculus ability 
to represent hypothetical situations with the event calculus representation f actual 
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events. For simplicity, we restrict he representation to times which are situations 
or transitions between situations, in the spirit of Kakas and Miller [6]. 
We formulate both calculi as logic programs and reason with their iff-comple- 
tions, induction over situations and integrity constraints as approximations to the 
intended semantics of those programs. The technique of reasoning about logic 
programs using iff-completions and induction was introduced by Clark and Tarn- 
lund [4]. The resulting formalization of the situation calculus is similar to the 
formalization of Pinto and Reiter [15]. 
We show that the main result, reported in [11], holds for these more general 
versions of the event and situation calculi. The result states that the two calculi 
logically imply one another. Our derivation of the event calculus from the situation 
calculus, however, requires the use of induction, whereas our derivation of the 
situation calculus from the event calculus does not. The indication that the event 
calculus may be more powerful than the situation calculus, despite their equiva- 
lence, is also supported by our analysis of the missing car example (in Section 7). 
We allow events, such as updating deductive databases orpassing, amending and 
repealing legislation, which initiate and terminate the holding of arbitrary sen- 
tences. We formalize reasoning with such sentences using a proof predicate defined 
as a metalogic program. State or domain constraints and certain kinds of ramifica- 
tions are dealt with automatically asa by-product of this formulation. 
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 we present logic programming formulations of the 
situation and event calculi and their semantics in terms of iff-completions, integrity 
constraints and induction. In Section 5, for ease of reference, we list all the axioms 
and integrity constraints presented thus far. In Section 6 we show that the situation 
calculus with induction implies the event calculus, whereas the event calculus 
without induction implies the situation calculus. In Sections 7 and 8 we show how 
the calculi can be used for factual and hypothetical reasoning, including counter- 
factual reasoning, and how they can be extended to deal with ramifications. Finally, 
in Section 9 we conclude the work presented in this paper. 
2. THE SITUATION CALCULUS 
2.1. The Axioms 
The following two clauses constitute the core of our formulation of the situation 
calculus as a logic program. Together they define what sentences P hold in the 
situation result(A, S) that is the result of the transition from state S by an action 
of type A. 
holds(P, result(A, S)) *-- happens(A, S) A initiates(A, S, P) (S1) 
holds(P, result(A, S)) ~ happens(A, S) /x holds(P, S) /x -1 terminates(A, S, P). 
(s2) 
Terms starting in the upper case are variables. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
variables are assumed to be universally quantified in front of the formula in which 
they occur. 
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The first clause defines what sentences hold because they are initiated by an 
action. The second clause, called the frame axiom, defines what sentences hold 
because they held before the action and were not terminated by it. 
The definitions of the predicates initiates and terminates are domain-dependent. 
For example, the fact that an act of donor X giving object Y to recipient Z initiates 
the property of Z possessing Y and terminates the property of X possessing Y can 
be defined by the two clauses: 
initiates(give(X, Y Z), S, possess(Z, Y)) 
terminates (give (X, Y, Z), S, possess ( X, Y) ). 
Similarly, in the Yale shooting problem, the fact that if the gun is loaded then an 
act of shooting initiates the death of the turkey and terminates its life can be 
represented by the conditional clauses: 
initiates(shoot, S, dead) ~ holds(loaded, S)
terminates(shoot, S, alive) ~ holds(loaded, S). 
Most formulations of the situation calculus use a single predicate abnormal ([1], for 
example) instead of the two predicates initiates and terminates. The frame axiom in 
these formulations i  often given in the form: 
[holds(P, S) ~ hold(P, result(A, S))] ~ -7 abnormal(A, S, P). 
In our formulation we can derive an analogous formula 
[holds(P, S) ~ holds(P, result(A, S))] 
happens(A, S) A -7 initiates(A, S, P) A -1 terminates(A, S P) 
by using the iff-completion of clauses S1 and $2, which we use for reasoning about 
our formulation of the situation calculus program. Our use of the iff-completion is
discussed in Section 3. 
Among those formulations of the situation calculus which employ an abnormal- 
ity predicate, many, in effect, interpret abnormal(A, S, P) as "A initiates P in S or 
A initiates ~ P in S." This prevents two explicitly contradictory properties P and 
P from holding simultaneously. However, it does not prevent he simultaneous 
holding of two (or more) properties P1 ..... Pn, which are implicitly contradictory, 
due to the presence of domain-specific integrity constraints uch as 
[holds(Pt,S) A --. A holds(P,,S)]. 
Our formulation does not prevent explicitly or implicitly contradictory properties 
from holding simultaneously. We discuss this issue in [17] in the context of the 
event calculus, and show how the problem can be dealt with in different ways, 
depending on whether or not the given set of event descriptions i complete. 
We use the predicates initiates and terminates instead of abnormal because they 
facilitate our comparison with the event calculus. Moreover, it can be argued that 
they provide a semantically more meaningful formulation of the situation calculus 
itself, distinguishing between abnormalities due to initiation of sentences and those 
due to termination. 
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2.2. Restricting Situations to Possible Situations 
The inclusion of the condition happens(A, S) in $1 and $2 restricts the holding of 
properties to situations which are possible. The notion of possible situation can 
also be represented explicitly by the type predicate situation, defined as follows: 
situation(sO) (T1) 
situation(result(A, S)) ~- happens(A, S) A situation(S). (T2) 
The condition happens(A, S) in S1 and $2 could, consequently, be replaced by the 
condition situation(result(A, S ) ), which introduces happens(A, S) indirectly. 
The following integrity constraints ensure that any event which happens is a 
possible event, in the sense that it happens in a possible situation and all its 
preconditions actually or hypothetically hold in that situation: 
holds(P, S) ~ happens(A, S) A precondition(A, S P) (11) 
situation(S) ~ happens(A, S). (I2) 
Given I2, the two formulations of the situation calculus, one with happens and the 
other with situation, are equivalent. 
Integrity constraints, uch as I1 and I2, can be thought of as imposing restric- 
tions on predicates, such as happens, whose definition is unknown or incomplete. 
We will discuss the semantics of integrity constraints in the next section. 
Whether an event occurrence, happens(a, s), or a property holding, holds(p, s), 
is actual or hypothetical can be reduced to determining whether the situation 
results(a, s) or s, respectively, is actual or hypothetical. This, in turn, can be done by 
means of assertions uch as 
actual(s0) 
actual(s) 
actual( result (a, s) ), 
where at most one sequence of events is asserted as actual. The distinction 
between actual and hypothetical situations does not affect the statement or the 
proof of the main theorem, presented in Section 6. We shall discuss actual and 
hypothetical events in more detail in Section 7. 
As with the domain-specific predicates initiates and terminates, the definition of 
the predicate precondition is domain dependent, for example: 
precondition(give(X, Y, Z), S, possess(X, Y)). 
In the standard formulations of the situation calculus, such preconditions of 
actions are ignored, or else are catered for by including extra conditions in the 
analogues of clauses S1 and $2. In fact, our inclusion of the condition happens(A, S) 
in $1 and $2, together with the integrity constraint I1, achieves a similar effect to 
the latter of these two approaches. 
2.3. The Initial Situation 
Before we discuss the semantics of the situation calculus in the next section, we 
need to discuss the representation f the initial situation, sO. There are at least two 
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possibilities. We can define the properties of the initial situation by means of a 
clause 
holds(P, sO) ~ initially(P) 
together with appropriate clauses defining the predicate initially. 
Alternatively, we may assume, without loss of generality, that nothing holds in 
the initial situation sO and that all properties of the initial situation are actually 
properties of the successor of the initial situation, result(creation, sO), where 
creation is defined by clauses of the form initiates(creation, sO, P). For our purpose, 
the second alternative is more convenient than the first. 
Because a creation event can initiate any property and has no preconditions, we 
need an integrity constraint 
S = sO ~ happens(creation, S) (i3) 
to prevent asserting the occurrence of creation in any situation other than the 
initial situation. 
3. THE SEMANTICS OF THE SITUATION CALCULUS PROGRAM 
Many different semantics have been defined for logic programs. To compare the 
situation and event calculi, it is convenient o use the completion semantics [3] 
augmented with integrity constraints and induction [4]. 
Like circumscription [14], the completion semantics augmented with induction 
seeks to formalize the intention that a set of axioms (in our case, the if-halves of 
logic programs) characterizes the smallest set of relations which satisfy the axioms. 
In the case of a program consisting of Horn clauses without equality, there is only 
one such smallest set, which is the unique minimal Herbrand model of the pro- 
gram [22]. This is the semantics associated with the program by (virtually) all 
existing semantics of logic programming. For such Horn clause programs, the iff- 
completion is an approximation to the intended meaning, and the iff-completion 
augmented with axioms of induction is a better approximation. 1 
The case of normal programs, like $1 and $2, is more complicated. Not only do 
circumscription and logic programming semantics diverge, but the different seman- 
tics for logic programming also diverge. What many of these semantics have in 
common, however, is that the iff-completion, augmented with induction, is a safe 
approximation to them. It is safe in the sense that any logical consequence of the 
iff-completion augmented with induction is a property of the program, in that it is 
true in all intended models of the program characterized by these semantics. 
It can be argued that the iff-completion together with a first-order axiom schema of induction 
approximates the intended minimal Herbrand model in exactly the same sense that the logical 
consequences of the Peano axioms of arithmetic approximate he intended model of arithmetic. This 
model can be understood, in turn, as the unique minimal Herbrand model of the Horn clauses which 
define addition and multiplication. 
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3.1. Iff-Completion 
The construction of the completion of a logic program is well known [3, 13]. 
Applied to S1 and $2, this construction gives: 
holds(P, $2) ~, 
3A1, S1 [[$2 = result(A1, S1) 
Ahappens( A1, S1) A initiates(A1, S1, P)] V (SC) 
[$2 = result( A1, $1) A happens( A1, S1) A holds( P, $1) A 
-~ terminates( AI, S1, P)]] 
together with the Clark equality theory (CET), which consists of the unique name 
axioms including 
[A1 = A2 A $1 = $2] ~ result(A1, S1) = result(A2, $2) (CET1) 
BS [sO = result(A, S)] (CET2) 
and the usual axioms of equality. 
Similarly, we need to complete the definitions of the initiates, terminates, 
precondition and situation predicates, but not happens and actual. 
3.2. Integrity Constraints 
Integrity constraints in relational and deductive databases are first order sentences 
that express invariant properties of relations whose definitions can be updated. 
Like iff-completions and induction, they provide a safe approximation to the 
intended semantics of the definitions in the sense that they are meant o be true in 
all intended models. 
Integrity constraints, understood in this way, do not affect he intended meaning 
of definitions, but simply help to characterize that meaning in syntactic terms (like 
the only-if halves of definitions and induction axioms). Thus integrity constraints 
can safely be used as additional premises to prove properties of logic programs. 
Integrity constraints can play a useful role both when they describe properties of 
predicates whose definition is given, and when they describe properties of predi- 
cates whose definitions are unknown or inaccessible. A good (and instructive) 
example of the latter use of integrity constraints i in semantic query optimization 
[2], where integrity constraints describing extensional predicates are used together 
with definitions of intensional predicates, to optimize a query before transmitting it 
to the extensional database. Integrity constraints can similarly be used to describe 
properties of abductible predicates, whose definitions are unknown or incomplete, 
and which can appear in answers to queries, in much the same way that extensional 
predicates appear as the result of transforming a query by means of semantic query 
optimization. 
In our formulations of the situation calculus and event calculus, the predicates 
happens and actual can be understood as predicates with inaccessible or only 
partially accessible definitions. 2 Integrity constraints, uch as 11-13, are properties 
of the complete, but unknown definitions. Consequently these integrity constraints 
2 In Section 7, we will consider the case where happens(A, S) is interpreted as "A is possible in S," 
in which case happens can be defined in such a way that 11-13 are properties of the definition. 
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can be used as premises to prove properties of logic programs uch as S1 and $2, 
augmented with definitions for happens and actual. So long as in any given 
application, whenever a complete definition of these predicates is given, the 
integrity constraints hold in all intended models of these definitions, then any 
properties proved with the aid of the integrity constraints will also be properties of 
the definitions themselves. 
3.3. Temporal Ordering 
One of the limitations of most formulations of the situation calculus is that 
situations need to be named explicitly in terms of a sequence of actions following 
the initial state. As a result, it is virtually impossible to represent narratives with 
incomplete information. This limitation can be overcome by relating situations to 
one another by means of an ordering relation. Such ordering relations have been 
defined for the situation calculus by Shanahan [19] and Pinto and Reiter [15]. 
For our purposes, it is convenient to introduce a term, trans(A, S), representing 
the transition from situation S to result(A, S) caused by an event of type A. This 
allows the occurrence of any number of alternative vents immediately following a 
given situation, giving rise to branching timelines. 
In the following definitions, the auxiliary predicate ,~ represents the immediate 
succession of time points, and < represents its transitive closure: 
S -~ trans(A, S) ~- situation(result(A, S)) 
trans(A, S) a result(A, S) ~ situation(result(A, S)) 
T1 < T2 ~ T1 ,~ T2 
T1 < T2*-- T1 <TA TAT2.  
As is the case with all definitions, these definitions need to be completed. We name 
these completions LESS. We also need the following unique name axioms in the 
Clark equality theory: 
-7 :IA, S [result(A, S) = trans(A, S)] 
-7 3A, S [sO = trans(A, S)] 





Induction can be defined either over all time points or over all situations. The 
latter is more convenient for our purposes. 
VS [(P(S) (-- situation(S)] 
(I)(s0) A VA,S[cP(result(A, S)) (--- (I)(S) A situation(result(A, S))], 
(IND) 
where ~b is a metavariable standing for any first-order formula (as in Peano 
arithmetic). 
Given the completed efinitions of 4 ,  < ,  and situation, the unique name 
axioms, and IND, we can show the following properties of the predicate <.  We 
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need 
(j) in 
(a), (b), (c), and (D in the proof of the main theorem in Section 6, and we use 
the missing car example in Section 7. 
(a) -7 :IS [S < sO] 
(b) VS1,S2,S3 [$1 < $3 ~ S1 < $2 A $2 < $3] 
(c) VS1,S2 [~$2 < S1 ,-- S1 < $2] 
(d) VS, A-~ :IS1 IS < S1 A S1 < result(A, S) A situation(S1)] 
(e) 'qS --1S < S 
(f) VS, A-~ :IT [trans(A, S) < T A T < result(A, S)] 
(g) VS, A-1 :IT [S < T A T < trans(A, S)] 
(h) VSI, S2 [situation(S1) ~ S1 < $2 A m:IA, S (S1 = trans(A,S))] 
(i) VS1,S2 [situation(S2) ~ S1 < $2 A ~ :IA, S ($2 = trans(A,S))] 
(j) VS1, $2, A [happens(A, S1) *-- trans(A, S1) < $2] 
4. THE SIMPLIFIED EVENT CALCULUS 
The original version of the event calculus [12] allowed concurrent and partially 
ordered events as well as the persistence of properties both backwards and 
forwards over time. It also catered for properties holding both during time periods 
and at time points. 
To compare the event calculus with the situation calculus we shall consider a 
special case of the former that is analogous to the restrictions of the latter. We can 
obtain this special case by removing all consideration of backward persistence of 
properties and preprocessing away all reference to time periods. We do the latter 
by replacing all conditions referring to properties holding for time periods by their 
definition in terms of events happening at time points. Such a special case was 
introduced in ([10], [5], [18]). In [17] we showed that this special case, in completion 
form augmented with integrity constraints, has much of the power of the original 
event calculus, and even overcomes some of its deficiencies. 
The special case of the event calculus has at its core a single axiom: 
holds(P, T2) <-- happens(E1, T1) A initiates(El, P) A T1 < T2 A 
=IE* ,T* [happens(E* ,T* ) A 
terminates(E* ,P) A T1 _< T* A T* < T2] 
which expresses that a property holds at a time point if it was initiated by an event 
which happened at an earlier time point and no intervening event happened to 
terminate the property. 
The condition T1 < T2 has the effect of ensuring that properties hold only after 
their initiating event happens. The inequality T*< T2 ensures that properties, 
including preconditions of events, hold at the time they are terminated by some 
event. 
We further restrict our version of the event calculus to the special case where 
the < relation on time points is identified with the < relation on situations and 
transactions. In this case we can replace the condition 7"1 <_ T* by the inequality 
T1 < T*, using the assumptions that two different events do not occur at the same 
time (expressed by CET5), and that no event initiates and terminates the same 
property. Also event tokens are unnecessary because individual events can be 
identified by their action or event types and the situations in which they cause a 
transition. We may, therefore, instantiate the event calculus axiom by means of a 
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particular epresentation for events, representing event tokens E by pairs (A, S) 
consisting of an action or event type A and a situation S. This reformulates the 
event calculus predicates in the situation calculus vocabulary, as follows: 
Replace happens(E,T) by happens( (A, S) , trans(A, S) ) 
where trans( A, S) is the time T between S and result( A, S) 
when E occurs. For simplicity we abbreviate this to 
happens(A, S). 
Replace initiates(E,P) by initiates(A,S,P). 
Replace terminates(E,P) by terminates(A,S,P). 
Finally, we restrict he holding of properties to situations. The resulting completion 
of the event calculus axiom has the iff-form: 
holds(P, $2) ,~ 
situation(S2) A 
3A1, S1 {happens(A1, S1) A initiates(A1, S1, P) A trans(A1, S1) < $2 A (EC) 
3A*, S* [happens(A*, S* ) A terminates(A*, S*, P) A 
trans(A1, S1) < trans(A*, S* ) A trans(A*, S* ) < $2] } 
Like our version of the situation calculus, this formulation of the simplified event 
calculus can be used for reasoning with both actual and hypothetical situations and 
events. 
Our formulations of the situation calculus and of the simplified event calculus 
differ only in the core axioms SC and EC. The remaining axioms, IND, LESS, 
CET, constraints 11-I3 and the completion of the type definition T1 and T2, are 
common to both calculi. 
5. SUMMARY OF ALL AXIOMS AND INTEGRITY CONSTRAINTS 
The situation calculus core axiom: 
(SC) holds(P, $2) ~ 
3A1,$1 [[$2 = result(A1,S1) A happens(A1,S1) A 
initiates(A1, $1, P)] v 
[$2 = result(A1, $1) A happens(A1, $1) A holds(P, $1) A 
-7 terminates(A1, $1, P)] ]. 
The event calculus core axiom: 
(EC) holds(P, S2) "~, 
situation (S2) A 
3A1, S1 {happens(A1, S1) A initiates(A1, S1, P) A trans(A1, S1) < $2 A 
:IA*, S* [happens(A*, S* ) A terminates(A*, S*, P) A 
trans(A1, S1) < trans(A*, S*) A 
trans(A*, S* ) < $2] }. 
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The situation type definition (i.e. the completion of definition T1 and T2): 
(TYPE) situations(S) 
S =sO v 
:IA1, S1 [S = result(A1, SI) A happens(A1, S1) A situation(S1)]. 
The definitions of -~ and < : 
(LESS) T1 .~T2 
 al, $1 {[T2 = trans(Aa,T0 A situation(result(A1,T1)] v 
[T1 = trans(A1, $1) A T2 = result(A1, $1) 
A situation(result (A1, $1))] } 
T1 < T2 
T1 .~T2 v 3T [T1 < T AT ~T2] .  
The integrity constraints: 
(I1) holds(P, S) <--- happens(A, S) A precondition(A, S, P) 
(I2) situation(S) ~ happens(A,S) 
(I3) S = sO ~ happens(creation,S). 
The axiom schema of induction: 
( IND) VS [O(S) ~ situation(S)] 
d0(s0) A V A, S [d0(result(a, S)) <--- O(S) A situation(result(A, S))] .  






[A1 = A2 A S1 = $2] ~ result(A1, S1) = result(A2, $2) 
-7 ~S [sO = result(A, S)] 
-13A, S [result(A, S) = trans(A, S)] 
3A, S [sO = trans(A, S)] 
[A1 = A2 A S1 = $2] ~ trans(A1, S1) = trans(A2, $2). 
6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO CALCULI 
The relationship between our formulations of the situation and event calculi can 




where SC and EC are the iff-forms of the situation calculus and event calculus core 
axioms respectively, IND is the axiom schema of induction and COMM consists of 
12, LESS, TYPE and the properties (a), (b), (c) and ( f )  common to the two 
calculi. 
COMM, EC ~ SC 
COMM, SC, IND ~ EC, 
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PROOF. 
(i) Given COMM, EC is equivalent to 
holds(P, S2) ~ (eventl) v (event2), 
where (eventl) has the form 
::]A1, S1 
(situation(S2) A happens(A1, S1) A initiates(A1, S1, P) A $2 = result(A1, S1) A 
3A*, S* [happens(A*, S* ) A terminates(A*, S*, P) A 
trans(A1, $1) < trans(A*, S* ) A trans(A*, S* ) < $2] ) 
and (event2) has the form 
3Al,  S 1, T 
{situation(S2) A happens(A1, $1) A initiates(A1, $1, P) A 
trans(A1, $1) < T/x T ,~ $2 A 
3A*, S* [happens(A*, S* ) A terminates(A*, S*, P) A 
trans(A1, S1) < trans(A*, S* ) A trans(A*, S* ) < $2] }. 
This equivalence can be shown by replacing the condition trans(A1, $1) < $2 in EC 
by its definition in LESS and distributing disjunction over conjunction. 
On the other hand, SC is equivalent to 
holds(P, $2) ~ (sit1) v (sit2), 
where (sit1) has the form 
::IA, S [$2 = result(A, S) A happens(A, S) A initiates(A, S, P)] 
and (sit2) has the form 
::IA, S [$2 = result(A,S) A happens(A,S) A holds(P,S) A 
terminates(A, S P)]. 
It is not difficult to show that (event1) and (sit1) are equivalent in the theory 
COMM using lemma (f), stating that there is no time T between trans(A1, $1) and 
result(A1, $1), and the assumption I2, that events happen only in situations. 
Also, using LESS and TYPE, (event2) is equivalent to 
::iA1, S1,A, S,T 
{$2 = result(A, S) A happens(A, S) A situation(S)/x 
happens(A1, $1) A initiates(A1, $1, P) A trans(A1, $1) < T A 
T ,~ result(A,S) A -~terminates(A,S,P) A 
-1 3A*, S* [happens(A*, S* ) A terminates(A*, S*, P) A 
trans(A1,S1) < trans(A*,S*)/x trans(A*,S*) < S]}. 
But this is equivalent in turn to (sit2) using the following instance EC* of EC 
holds(P, S) 
situation(S) A
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{3A1, S1 {happens(A1, S1) m initiates(A1, S1, P) A trans(A1, S1) < S/x 
-~ 3A*, S* [happens(A*, S* ) m terminates(A*, S*, P) A 
tans(A1, S1) < trans(A*, S* ) /x trans(A*, S* ) < S] }} 
and the fact that given situation(result(A, S)) 
3T [trans(A1,S1) < T A T ¢ result(A,S)] = trans(A1,S1) < S 
by LESS. 
(ii) The proof of this part of the theorem is identical to that of part (i), up to the 
point of using EC* to show that (event2) is equivalent (in COMM) to (sit2). For 
part (ii) we use induction with EC* as the induction hypothesis and with EC as the 
theorem to be proved. This together with the assumption SC proves the induction 
conclusion EC. To complete the proof, we need to prove the base case of the 
induction, i.e., to show that EC holds when $2 = sO. But EC in this case is 
equivalent to 
.3P  [holds(P, sO)] 
which states that nothing holds in the initial state. This is an immediate conse- 
quence of SC. 
So by induction we have shown 
VS2 { [holds(P, $2) ~ conditions of EC] ~ situation(S2) }.
Since under SC and 12 both the conditions of EC and the head, holds(P, $2), imply 
situation(S2), this condition can be removed from above, and thus we prove EC. 
[] 
7. ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS 
7.1. Distinguishing between Actual and Hypothetical Situations 
Whereas the event calculus was originally intended for representing and reasoning 
about actual events, the situation calculus was designed for reasoning about 
hypothetical events and situations. Our inclusion of the conditions happens(A1, S1) 
in SC and EC is intended to unify the treatment of hypothetical nd actual events. 
In the case of the standard versions of the event calculus, in which all events are 
actual, the integrity constraints 11-13 restrict actual events to those which are 
possible. In the case of the standard formulations of the situation calculus, 
however, in which all events are hypothetical, the same integrity constraints are 
properties of the definition of what it means for an event of type A to be possible 
in a situation S. The definition can be given as follows: 
happens(A, S) ,~, 
{VP [holds(P, S) ,--- precondition(A, S P)] A situation(S) A
[S = sO ~ A = creation]}. 
We employ the integrity constraints, 11-13, because they capture the common 
ground shared by actual and hypothetical events. Notice that 11-13 are the only-if 
half of the definition. 
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To represent an actual event, in both calculi, we simply assert hat the event has 
happened and that the resulting situation is actual. To represent a hypothetical 
event, we also assert that the event has happened (either because it is given as 
input or because it is assumed by abduction), but say nothing about whether or not 
the resulting situation is actual. 
To ensure that at most one sequence of events is actual, we need to ensure that 
the following integrity constraints are properties of any definition of actual: 
actual(S) ~- actual(result(A, S)) 
A1 = A2 ~ actual(result(A1, S)) A actual(result(A2, S)). 
7.2. Reasoning with Multiple Timelines 
The following example, based on an example in [20], shows how information about 
an event on one timeline can be used to derive information about an event on 
another timeline. The example is neutral with respect o whether any of the two 
timelines is actual. 
Here is an informal description of the problem. The event of creation happens 
in the initial state and initiates a gun being loaded and an individual being alive. 
Then an event of spinning the chamber of the gun happens. We then consider two 
alternative scenarios. In the first, an event of waiting happens, and in the second an 
event of shooing. The problem is to show that after the shooting the individual is 
not alive if after the waiting the gun would have remained loaded. 
Such reasoning is possible in the standard formulations of the situation calculus. 
Here we show that it is also possible in our formulation of the event calculus. We 
formalize the problem as follows. 
Suppose we are given 
holds (loaded, result( wait, result (spin, result( creation, sO) ) ) ), ( 1 ) 
where the if-halves of the definitions of initiates and terminates include the 
following assertions. 
initiates ( creation, sO, loaded) (2) 
initiates ( creation, sO, alive ) (3) 
terminates(shoot, S, alive) ~ holds(loaded, S). (4) 
Assume moveover, that it is a property of the complete definitions that 
-~ 3S initiates(shoot, S, alive) (5) 
3S initiates(wait, S  loaded) (6) 
-~ 3S initiates(spin, S  loaded). (7) 
We make no other assumptions about the definitions of initiates and terminates. 
From assumption (1), stating that the gun would be loaded after waiting, using 
the only-if half of EC, (6) and (7), we can derive 
terminates ( pin, result (creation, sO), loaded). 
Now, using the if-half of EC, we can conclude 
holds( loaded, result ( spin, result (creation, sO) ) ). 
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Therefore, by (4) 
terminates ( hoot, result (spin, result (creation, sO) ), alive ). 
Finally, using (5) and the contrapositive of the only-if half of EC we conclude 
-~ holds(alive, result(shoot, result(spin, result(creation, sO)))). 
Moreover, using (1), EC and TYPE, we can show 
situation (result(shoot, result(spin, result(creation, sO))) ). 
There are two relatively minor differences between this example and the 
treatment of the example in [20]. First, we use the situation structure of the 
situation calculus, whereas [20] uses more general time points, in the spirit of 
the original simplified event calculus. Second, we use properties (2)-(7) of the 
completion of initiates and terminates, whereas [20] uses the iff-completion of the 
definitions explicitly. 
7.3. The Missing Car Example 
This problem [7] illustrates the theorem of Section 6. The problem can be solved in 
both calculi. However, its solution requires induction in the situation calculus but 
not in the event calculus. 
The scenario is that a car is parked in a car park initially, but it is not there 
later. The problem is to explain the absence of the car from the car park. Formally, 
we know that 
3S' [ = holds(in, S') A trans(park, sO) < S' A situation(S')]. (1) 
Furthermore, we assume that the following assertions are included in the defini- 
tions of initiates and terminates. 
initiates (park, S, in) (2) 
terminates(steal, S,in) (3) 
terminates (tow, S, in). (4) 
Assume, moreover, that it is a property of the complete definitions that 
terminates(A, S, in) --* A = steal v A = tow. (5) 
We would like to conclude that at some time after the car was parked and before S' 
it was stolen or towed away. 
From assumption (1), using the contrapositive of the if-half of EC, lemma (j) of 
subsection 3.4 and (2) we can derive 
=IA*, S*, S' [happens(A*, S* ) A terminates(A*, S*, in) A 
trans(park, s0) < trans(A*, S* ) A trans(A*, S* ) < S' A 
situation(if)]. 
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Using property (5) of terminates, we get the expected result, i.e., 
:IA*,S*,S' {happens(A*,S*) A [A* = steal V A* = tow] m 
trans(park, sO) < trans(A*, S* ) /x trans(A*, S* ) < S'/x 
situation(if)}. 
The derivation in the situation calculus is more complicated and requires the use 
of induction. Using (1), SC, TYPE and LESS we can derive 
3A, S, S' {S' = result(A, S)/x happens(A, S) A situation(S) /x 
trans(park, sO) < S'/x --1 initiates(A, S, in) /~ 
[ -1 holds(in, S) v terminates(A, S in)]}. 
Using property (5) of terminates, and distributing some of the disjunction over the 
conjunction, we get 
=IA, S,S' {[S' = result(A,S) A happens(A,S) A trans(park, s0) < S' A 
[A = steal V A = tow]] v Rest}. 
The disjunct Rest represents an unbounded number of further answers, which can 
be obtained in a similar manner. It is easy to see that, to obtain the single, more 
general conclusion of the event calculus, it is necessary to use induction. 
8. RAMIFICATIONS 
8.1. Extending SC and EC 
The predicate holds(P, S) can be understood as a metapredicate which expresses 
that the sentence named P holds explicitly (i.e., as an axiom) in the situation 
named S. A situation can be thought of either as a time point or as the set of all 
sentences, namely the theory, that holds at a given time point. Under this latter 
interpretation, holds(P, S) is a special case of the predicate demo(S, P) used to 
represent the proof predicate in metaprogramming (e.g., [8]). 
In the general case P in holds(P, S) can name an arbitrary sentence. Such 
generality is necessary, for example, in applications to the formalization of deduc- 
tive database updates, the passing, amendment and repeal of legislation, and belief 
revision in intelligent agents. In practice, and for all the examples in this paper, it 
suffices for P to name a sentence in logic programming form. Standard formula- 
tions of the situation calculus either do not use a metapredicate at all or, if they do, 
limit themselves to cases where P names an atomic sentence or, at most, the 
negation of an atomic sentence. 
The use of the metapredicate holds(P, S) already caters for the possibility that 
P might name an arbitrary sentence. The core situation calculus and event calculus 
axioms apply, without change, to this more general case. However, without addi- 
tional axioms they do not completely characterize the set of all sentences that hold 
at any given time. They characterize, instead, only those sentences which hold 
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explicitly (as axioms) at that time. To define the set of all sentences which hold 
explicitly or implicitly we need additional axioms such as: 
demo(S, P) *-- holds(P, S) (D1) 
demo(S, P) ~ demo(S, P ~ Q) A demo(S, Q) (D2) 
demo(S,P A Q) ~ demo(S,P) A demo(S, Q) (D3) 
demo(S, ~ P) ~ ~ demo(S, P) (D4) 
demo(S, P) ~ demo(S, VX P) (D5) 
Here the metapredicate d rno(S, P) expresses that the sentence named P can be 
demonstrated from the object level theory at situation S. 
Clauses D2 and D3 constitute the familiar "vanilla meta-interpreter" which 
defines the proof predicate for propositional Horn clause theories. D4 can be 
understood as defining object level negation, -7 P, as failure to prove P. Clause D5 
can be regarded as relating the so-called ground and non-ground representations 
of variables as discussed in [9]. 
D1-D5 exemplify the use of logic programming as a meta-language to define its 
own proof predicate. Other clauses could be added to the definition to extend the 
object language beyond the logic programming case. D4, which interprets object 
level negation as negation as failure, could be replaced by clauses which define 
negation differently. For simplicity, and for the purposes of this paper, we can 
assume that the completion of D1-D5 is the definition of the demo predicate. 
Although the core situation calculus and core event calculus axioms require no 
modification to deal with the initiation and termination of arbitrary sentences, the 
integrity constraint I1 needs to be generalized: 
demo(S, P) ~ happens(A, S) A precondition(A, S P) 
to take into account he fact that preconditions of events might be ramifications of 
other events. Similarly, some domain-specific assertions of the initiates and termi- 
nates predicates may have to be generalized. For example: 
initiates(shoot, S, dead) ~ demo(S, loaded) 
terminates(shoot, S, alive) ~ demo(S, loaded). 
8.2. An Example from Legislation 
The following example illustrates the need to extend the holds predicate by means 
of demo. Here bna48 and bna83 name the British Nationality Acts of 1948 and 
1983, respectively. For simplicity and naturalness, we use the uncompleted repre- 
sentation and we use time points instead of situations. 
happens(bna48, 1948) 
happens(bna83, 1983) 
initiates(bna48, VX [citizen(X, uk) ~ born(X, uk)] ) 
terminates(bna83, VX [citizen(X, uk) ~ born(X, uk)]) 
happens(accept-belief, 1941) 
happens(reject-belief, 1967) 
initiates ( accept-belief, born( mary, uk) ) 
terminates ( reject-belief, born (mary, uk) ). 
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Assume a completion in which no event between bna48 and bna83 terminates the 
law that anyone born in the U.K. is a citizen of the U.K., and in which no event 
between accept-belief and reject-belief terminates the belief that Mary was born in 
the U.K. Then the original simplified event calculus axiom (introduced at the 
beginning of Section 4) implies 
holds(VX [citizen(X, uk) ~ born(X, uk)], T) ~ 1948 < T < 1983 
holds(born(mary, uk),T) ~ 1941 < T < 1967. 
Together with D1, D2, and D5, these imply 
demo(Y, citizen(X, uk)) ~ demo(Y, born(X, uk)) A 1948 < T < 1983 (B1) 
demo(Y, born(mary, uk)) ~ 1941 < T < 1967. (B2) 
Using transitivity of < and the facts that 1941 < 1948 and 1967 < 1983, these 
imply 
demo(T, citizen(mary, uk)) ~ 1948 < T < 1967, 
i.e., between 1948 and 1967 it is believed that Mary is a citizen of the U.K. 
A similar result would be obtained if we used situations instead of time points. 
We simply use four situations l, s2, s3, s4 corresponding to the times just before 
each of 1941, 1948, 1967, 1983, respectively, and assert 
result(accept-belief, sl) < result(bna48, s2) < result(reject-belief, s3) < 
result (bna83, s4). 
Using EC, LESS and transitivity of <, we would then be able to derive 
demo(S, citizen(mary, uk)) *-- situation(S) A result(bna48, s2) < S < s3. 
Standard treatments of the situation calculus, which restrict the predicate P in 
holds(P, S) to atoms or their negation, cannot represent this kind of reasoning. 
However, they can approximate it by using so-called state or domain constraints. In
this example, domain constraints would be used to formulate B1 and B2 as 
domain-specific axioms in terms of holds rather than in terms of demo. Our 
treatment derives the analogues of domain constraints from more basic assump- 
tions. Moreover, expressing B1 and B2 in terms of demo rather than holds enables 
us to complete the definition of holds without having to worry about interactions 
between the completion and domain constraints. 
The simplified British Nationality Act example shows how the combination of 
events which initiate and terminate the holding of sentences together with the 
definition of the demo predicate deals automatically with certain kinds of ramifi- 
cations. In this case, the belief that Mary is a citizen of the U.K., which begins after 
1948, is a ramification of passing bna48 and the earlier belief that Mary was born in 
the U.K., initiated in 1941. The blocks world provides another example. 
8.3. A Blocks World Example 
In this example, apart from the event of creation, all other events affect only the 
location of objects. The property of an object being clear is a ramification of there 
being nothing on it. The act of creation itself can be thought of as initiating the 
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sentences that state that an object is clear if it is not covered, and that it is covered 
if there is something on it. As before, the axioms for the domain specific happens, 
initiates and terminates predicates are common to both calculi: 
happens( creation, sO) 
initiates(creation, sO VU [clear(U) ,-- -~ covered(U)]) 
initiates(creation, sO VU,V [covered(U) ~ on(V, U)]).  
Assume a completion in which the two sentences, above, initiated by creation are 
never terminated, i.e., assume that 
3A, S {terminates(A, S, VU [clear(U) *-- -~ covered(U)] )} 
-7 3A, S {terminates(A, S, VU,V [covered(U) ~ on(V, U)] )} 
are properties of the completion. 
Using the event calculus axiom EC we can derive 
holds(VU [clear(U) ~ ~ covered(U)], S) 
trans(creation, sO) < S A situation(S) 
holds(VU,V [covered(U) ~ on(V, U)],  S) ,-- 
trans(creation, sO) < S A situation(S). 
These can also be derived using the situation calculus axiom SC. However, in this 
case the proof requires the use of induction. 
In both calculi, to reason further with these clauses, we can use the definition of 
demo to derive 
demo(S, clear(U)) 
demo(S, covered(U)) A trans(creation, sO) < S A situation(S) 
demo(S, covered(U)) 
demo(S, on(V, U)) A trans(creation, sO) < S A situation(S). 
In standard treatments of the situation calculus, similar clauses, expressed in terms 
of holds rather than demo, would need to be given explicitly as state or domain 
constraints. In our case, they are derivable from more fundamental ssumptions. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED WORK 
To compare the situation calculus and event calculus, we have made minor 
modifications to both calculi, and formulated them as logic programs. Not only are 
the resulting calculi in some sense equivalent, but they both inherit the ability from 
standard formulations of the situation calculus to deal with hypothetical situations, 
and from the simplified event calculus to deal with actual states of affairs. For 
these latter two purposes, we have adapted the technique of [20, 21] for represent- 
ing branching time. 
However, our representation f time is less general than that of [20, 21], and is 
closer to that of [6], because, for the purposes of our comparison, we restrict 
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ourselves to the special case where times are situations or transitions between 
situations. 
We have seen that our derivation of the event calculus from the situation 
calculus requires proof by induction, whereas our derivation of the situation 
calculus from the event calculus does not. This suggests that the event calculus, 
even when restricted to times which are situations and transitions is more powerful 
than the situation calculus, as exemplified by our representation f the missing car 
example. We also believe that the more general case of the event calculus, similar 
to that studied by [20, 21], is more natural and more flexible than the restricted 
case. This was illustrated, for instance, in Section 8.2 in the British Nationality Act 
example. 
In this paper we have been more careful than in our earlier paper [11] to clarify 
our understanding of the iff-completions, induction and integrity constraints, in 
relation to the semantics of logic programs. Our current view is that the former 
should be understood as approximations to the intended semantics, in the same 
way that Peano axioms approximate truth in arithmetic. This point of view may be 
useful in understanding better the relationship between logic programming seman- 
tics and circumscription, which defines semantics directly in terms of truth in all 
minimal models. We believe that clarifying this relationship is an important 
direction for future research, and that the situation calculus and event calculus 
provide a promising context for such an investigation. 
Our use of the iff-completion and induction yields a formalization of the 
situation calculus which is closer to Reiter's formulation [16] than to other 
formulations using circumscription. However, one difference between his approach 
and ours is the treatment of state constraints and ramifications. Our formulation is 
based upon allowing the holds predicate to take arbitrary sentences as arguments 
and using the demo predicate to formalize reasoning with such sentences. We 
believe that investigating more closely the relationship between these and other 
approaches to state constraints and ramifications i a fruitful direction of research. 
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